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Abstract
Over the last two decades, the Federal Reserve has been given more powers to address
and manage crises; at the same time, there has been increasing legislative gridlock in the
American Congress. This paper aims to investigate how potential legislative gridlock affects the
action of central banks in an attempt to understand whether or not central banks are truly
independent in their actions or if they are influenced by a less efficient legislative body;
specifically, the main hypothesis this paper seeks to test is: if indicators of greater legislative
gridlock are present, then there is a greater likelihood the central bank acts and acts with greater
speed. The paper concludes that there is not much evidence to support this hypothesis; in fact,
the quantitative results suggest the presence of or greater amount of some indicators actually
decrease the likelihood of the central bank acting along with its speed. Following these results
with a case study, however, did support some original expectations. Overall, there were no
consistent results across the quantitative and qualitative analyses, suggesting there may be other
factors that explain such differences.
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“It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But
above all, try something.”
- President Franklin Delano Roosevelt




When a crisis unfolds that has deep economic and financial ramifications, a country’s
leadership must act decisively to prevent the economic turmoil from getting out of control. Two
main options are available to a country, depending on the nature of the crisis: fiscal policy or
monetary policy. Governmental leadership has the ability to pass legislation that deploys funds to
stymie the crisis – whether it's providing stimulus to the economy or bailing out specific affected
institutions or industries – while creating new regulations and enforcement mechanisms to
decrease the likelihood of such a crisis ever happening again. However, passage of such
legislation is not without a variety of hurdles or considered guaranteed at all; differing political
factions, competing ideologies, size of the majority, and other forms of friction-causing factors
play large roles in the process. Consequently, while powerful, effective fiscal policy can be
difficult to get passed in a speedy and efficient manner; this inaction can further cause the crisis
to get worse.
When the gears behind fiscal policy come to a halt, the other tool available to help the
economy is that of monetary policy. Central banks, the institutions in charge of monetary policy,
are primarily responsible for the control of their respective money supplies and affect interest
rates. While commonplace now, central banks did not always have these roles. Likewise, over
time, the role of the central bank is constantly evolving and the opinions of what a central bank
should or should not do is changing as well. For example, a central bank’s role of lender of last
resort became widely accepted (and expected) when, during the Panic of 1866, the Bank of
England ‘supported the refinancing of viable banks and brokers by depleting its own reserves”
which allowed financial stability to return in a few months.12 Since then, depending on the
country, modern central banks have differing mandates while having many common functions.
The Federal Reserve, for example, has a dual mandate in which it is tasked to stabilize inflation
and promote maximum employment.3
What sets central banks apart from legislative bodies is their independence. For the
purposes of credibility, political transparency, and efficiency, most central bank actors are
3 “The Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate.” The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 20 October
2020.
2 Ibid
1 Sowerbutts, Rhiannon. “The demise of Overned Gurney.” Quarterly Bulletin, The Bank of England, 2016, pp.
94-106.
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allowed to use their discretion in accordance with the laws governing the bank itself. Thanks to
this convenient attribute, central banks can often pursue the same policy goals like the legislative
body, such as maximizing employment, via different means; whereas lawmakers might call for a
public works program to increase employment, central banks can create an investment friendly
environment by lowering the cost of borrowing funds, which would eventually employ people.
Similarly, if the need for an economic stimulus is required, the federal government can pass
legislation that delivers direct payments to citizens. The Federal Reserve, however, could cut
interest rates, which would allow homeowners to refinance their mortgages. By doing so,
homeowners would be able to have lower monthly mortgage payments; as a result, these
homeowners would have more money in their pockets to spend on the consumption of goods.4
In times of crisis, these two macroeconomic policy sets – fiscal and monetary – are
available for use. While these tools are distinct, they can be used to accomplish the same goal in
varying ways. Ideally, the institutions in charge of these policy tools would work in a
complementary manner, working efficiently to solve the crisis at hand effectively and efficiently.
There have been critical instances, however, where central banks have moved quickly to stabilize
economic downturns by taking advantage of their unilateral authority. On 9/11, the Federal
Reserve ensured that the banking system functioned smoothly amid the uncertain nature of the
day.5 During the Great Recession of 2008, the Federal Reserve once again moved to stabilize the
financial system, ensuring the liquidity of the system by acting as a dealer of last resort.6
While the speed and efficiency of a central banking authority is critical in crises, these
qualities might induce its legislative counterparts to become complacent. Such a dynamic has
occurred in the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States. As the impact of the crisis started to
be forecasted, the Federal Reserve once again moved to stabilize the financial system. While
Congress and the President were working on a large stimulus package, the Federal Reserve
continued to provide support, taking up most of the business and political headlines.7 Once the
CARES act was passed, the Federal Reserve, now armed with even more authority due to the
7 Saphir, Ann and Howard Schneider. “Powell says economy still needs Fed support, pushes back on inflation
worries.” Reuters, 23 February 2021.
6 Kohn, Donald. :The Federal Reserve’s Policy Actions during the Financial Crisis and Lessons for the Future.”
Bank of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 13 May 2010.
5 Neely, Christopher. “The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Sept. 11 Attacks.” The Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1 January 2002.
4 Lewis, Holden. “How The Federal Reserve Affects Mortgage Rates.” Nerd Wallet, 17 March
2021.
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legislation, still continued providing support. Since the start of the crisis on American soil so far,
Congress has only passed one stimulus bill while the Federal Reserve continuously supports the
economy. Throughout this period of time, Jerome Powell, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, has
publicly asked and advocated for more “direct fiscal support” as it would be easier to repay than
a Fed-backed loan.8 He also stated that “further support is likely to be needed from monetary and
fiscal policy” and there would be “tragic” outcomes if such support was not provided.9 In this
instance, the central bank’s leader is practically begging its fiscal counterpart to do more but to
no avail.
1.2: Research Question
The objective of this paper is to understand what are the key factors that affect the
dynamic between the institutions responsible for fiscal policy and the central banks when a crisis
arises – which of these factors cause the time delay between monetary and fiscal action and
contribute to whether or not these institutions will act at all. The paper is mainly concerned with
the latter: how the factors in question, which aim to capture the concept of legislative gridlock,
influence the legislature and central bank in their decisions to address the crisis through policy
changes. The examinations of time passed between institutional actions and the start of a crisis
will serve to further support or undermine the findings of main subjects of inquiry. The following
paper will be divided into two sections. First, this analysis will utilize a quantitative approach
that examines a group of variables to determine which ones are correlated with the action gap
between fiscal and monetary institutions. Following these correlations, multiple regression
analyses will be performed between the variables to investigate possible causality. Then, the
paper will undertake a qualitative approach, examining case studies to confirm the findings of





Given the lack of continuous legislation coming out of the American Congress during the
COVID-19 Pandemic, the Federal Reserve has been applauded for its efforts, taking a swift and
impactful role early on.10 Due to this success, it seems that the Federal Reserve has provided
cover to lawmakers, making it easier for them to be less active and unproductive.11 An
independent body like the Federal Reserve acting as the leader during crisis management is, on
the surface, not wholly compatible with a democratic system, where elected representatives
derive their power from and are accountable to the public.12 The decisions central banks make
have a tremendous influence on the individuals in their countries “yet the officials who make
these decisions will not have to answer to the publics whose jobs and quality of life hang in the
balance.”13 Moreover, with increased independence, central banks are often not required to
disclose basic information to citizens on why and how certain decisions were made.14 Though it
is true that the appointees on the Federal Reserve are accountable to Congress to an extent,
ultimately, it is much more difficult for the public to have any influence on a set of political
appointees than the legislators they directly vote in.
While the Federal Reserve is given its independence to Congress for the sake of
credibility and efficiency, it is this very independence that is allowing the federal lawmakers to
hide behind such actions and signal that progress is occurring when many issues are being left
unsolved. Moreover, as Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has suggested, there are
simply some areas of pain that the Federal Reserve cannot address.15
Given these developments, turning to the literature for insights can be perplexing; while
there are extensive bodies of research that separately examine the comparative characteristics of
legislatures, central bank actions, the relationship between legislatures and central banks, and
financial crises, there are limited pieces that attempt to connect these different subject areas via
quantitative analysis to understand how these institutions act in relation to each other when a
15 Saphir, Ann and Howard Schneider. “Powell says economy still needs Fed support, pushes back on inflation
worries.” Reuters, 23 February 2021.
14 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
12 Berman, Sheri, and Kathleen R. McNamara. “Bank on Democracy: Why Central Banks Need Public Oversight.”
Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, 1999, pp. 2–8.
11 Ibid.
10 Irwin, Neil. “How the Fed’s Quick Action May Have Given Congress Cover for Inaction.” The New York Times,
15 September 2020.
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crisis occurs. This paper will aim to create such an analysis. Specifically, this paper will analyze
and try to explain how the institutional and political characteristics of legislative bodies not only
affect its own decisions but also how it affects the decision of a central bank during times of
crisis. To do so, the paper will rely on surveying multiple countries with potential correlations of
action gaps and the selected factors can help inform policy decision making; perhaps certain
conditions allow for the legislative body and central bank to work in tandem rather than allow
the latter to take the lead.
1.4: Literature Review
Gauging Legislative Success in The American Context
Within the first 100 days of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s first term, the federal
government swiftly moved to pass a series of items on an ambitious legislative agenda aimed at
fixing the catastrophic damages that stemmed from the Great Depression.16 These pieces of
legislation brought direct relief to those suffering the most, providing funds for food, blankets,
and other forms of support.17 Along with such relief, an array of agencies – like the Public Works
Administration and Agricultural Adjustment Administration – propelled into action by putting
people to work, starting a series of infrastructure projects, and cutting away at the deflation that
was hurting farmers.18 This undertaking is often considered one of the most ambitious uses of
fiscal policy by the government in American history, relying on taxation and deficit spending.19
Broadly speaking, if there was a large material problem plaguing the country, the government
spent money trying to solve it. The remarkable momentum of the Roosevelt administration in
those first 100 days set a precedent in which all future presidents’ first 100 days in office would
serve as a benchmark attesting to their overall effectiveness and success as a leader.20
20 Walsh, Kenneth. “The First 100 Days: Franklin Roosevelt Pioneered the 100-Day Concept.”




16 Walsh, Kenneth. “The First 100 Days: Franklin Roosevelt Pioneered the 100-Day Concept.”
U.S. News, 12 February 2009.
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Decades later, the Congress, politicians, and public institutions consistently have the
lowest approval ratings.21 On top of that, the Congress is increasingly becoming less active in the
amount of legislation being passed and ultimately signed by the executive.22 It would seem the
era of a powerful and active government is in the past. However, while the results of the first 100
days of FDR’s presidency have helped craft powerful narratives about what successful crisis
leadership looks like, such narratives rarely delve into the underlying political realities of the
moment, disregarding the ideological composition of government, compromises and
concessions, and failed items on the legislative agenda.
Structural Characteristics’ Effects on Legislative Efficiency
Understanding these underlying realities, and how they affect outcomes, can inform those
in charge with creating future institutions on how they should proceed. There has been a
considerable amount of research that examines how certain political structures and political
systems lead to the less efficient functioning of legislative bodies.
Gerring et al (2011), in “Are Parliamentary Systems Better?,” examines the differences in
“constitutional engineering” of countries, specifically comparing and contrasting the differences
in outcomes of parliamentary and presidential systems.23 Overall, they found that “parliamentary
systems are associated with superior governance.”24 Out of the different measures they tested,
two are of interest for this paper: the capacity for flexible policy making and decisive
leadership.25 First, whereas the “advocates of separate powers often emphasize the virtues of
political stability [...] advocates of parliamentary rule emphasize the problem of the status quo.”26
For the latter, the most important ability to have is the ability “to adapt to changing demands and
changing circumstances.”27 Parliamentary systems are understood to have more dynamic and
adaptive policy making capabilities. To examine the second measure, decisive leadership, more





23 Gerring et al. “Are Parliamentary Systems Better?” Boston University, 12 July 2011, 28.
22 French, Lauren. “Congress setting new bar for doing nothing.” Politico, 21 March 2016.
21 Enten, Harry. “Congress’ approval rating hasn’t hit 30% in 10 years. That’s a record.” CNN, 1 June 2019.
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decisiveness and resoluteness.28 Cox and McCubbins (2001) define decisiveness as the “ability
of a state to enact and implement policy change” and define resoluteness as the “ability of a state
to commit to maintaining a given policy.”29 Based on these definitions, parliamentary systems are
considered to be decisive while presidential ones are resolute.30 In sum, while presidential
systems might be able to conform to policies for a longer period of time credibly, parliamentary
ones are more adaptive to changing circumstances.
Consequently, the presence of a parliamentary system or lack thereof could quite likely
have an impact on the functioning of legislatures, and possibly, by extension, central banks; a
more efficient and responsive system of government would mean a legislature would be more
responsive in a crisis. Conversely, a presidential system, which is committed to existing policy
commitments, might indicate a more active central bank.
Along with legislative systems, the manner in which the populace is represented and
votes also has a bearing on legislative outcomes. Proportional representation sees less
polarization and more legislative success whereas plurality based electoral systems heighten
polarized politics and achieve less consensus.31 This is because the proportional representation
system distributes seats in the legislative body in proportion to the votes cast for each political
party, creating an environment for coalition building and consensus building.32 The plurality
electoral system, or a “winner-take-all system” rewards the person who wins the most votes not
the person who wins the majority; this means less popular views might be represented in the
legislature. This could have some consequences for gridlock; with representatives from districts
that are not fully captured, the legislature might be composed of individuals with more pointed
views who are less open to compromise. As a result, gridlock might worsen, causing more
legislative inefficiency and allowing the central bank to lead the way.
Another structure that can affect legislative outcomes is the number of veto points (or
veto players) present in the system. Tsebelis (1995) defines veto players as those “individual or
collective actors whose agreement is required for change of the status quo.”33 These veto players
33 Tsebelis, George. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism,
Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, no. 3, 1995, 289.
32 Ibid.
31 Adams, James and Nathan J. Rexford, “Electoral Systems and Issue Polarization.” The Oxford Handbook of
Electoral Systems, April 2018.
30 Gerring et al. “Are Parliamentary Systems Better?” Boston University, 12 July 2011, 5.
29 Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins. “The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes”. Cambridge
University Press, 2001, 27.
28 Ibid, 5.
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can be institutional (i.e. president) or partisan (i.e. political parties).34 Since veto players hold a
considerable amount of power over the policy making process, their leverage and negotiation
abilities can prolong or completely shut down the passage of pieces of legislation. As Tsebelis
notes, “the potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players.”35
Since the amount of veto points in a system has an effect on the responsiveness of it (i.e.
the potential for policy change), an increase might suggest that the legislative would be less
likely and slower to act; due to this possibility, a central bank, as a result of its independent
authority subject to its charter, might not only be more likely to act but also be quicker in its
response time relative to the start of a crisis.
Along with the amount of veto players present in a system, the partisan composition of
legislative bodies is an obvious influence on the legislative process. While it is commonly
understood the majority party (or coalition) will have more control over the legislative process,
this is not always the case. Edwards et al (1997) state, when discussing the dynamics of unified
and divided government on a president’s agenda,  that the “president’s party is not necessarily a
reliable source of support, unified government may not substantially increase the president’s
likelihood of success.”36 Although a part of the same party, different elected officials may
drastically vary ideologically, preventing them from signing onto key pieces of the legislative
agenda. A comparison of different presidential administrations and their relative congressional
majorities might illustrate this result as shown in the figure below.37
37 Silver, Nate. “Obama’s NO F.D.R - Nor Does He Have F.D.R’s Majority.” FiveThirtyEight, 1
March 2010.
36 Edwards, George C., et al. “The Legislative Impact of Divided Government.” American Journal of Political




Figure 1: Congressional Majorities of FDR, LBJ, and Barack Obama
Whereas President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Lyndon B. Johnson had
overwhelmingly large majorities in both chambers of Congress during their first terms, President
Barack Obama had a smaller one. The majorities held by the previous two presidents played a
significant part in passing large pieces of legislation packages such as the New Deal and Great
Society programs.38 In contrast, who also had major legislative achievements, famously struggled
to get a public option passed as a part of the Affordable Care Act due to one Democratic
senator’s disapproval.39
These observations would suggest that the larger the majority a party possesses, the less
marginal power each member of the party has in influencing and passing legislation.
Consequently, the amount by which the ruling party possesses a majority might have an effect on
the legislature when it is faced with a crisis; a majority political party with a lower majority of
seats in the legislature may have a more difficult time passing critical legislation during a crisis




compared to a political party that has a larger majority. As a result, a central bank may act with
more urgency if the legislature cannot address the needs of the crisis on its own.
Economy
The state of a nation’s economy will inform the nation's response to a financial or
economic crisis and how far it can go. For example, a nation with a less developed economy
might not have the same fiscal space as a more developed counterpart; fiscal space refers to the
extent a government’s budget can provide resources for certain purposes or its citizens without
compromising the nation’s financial stability and long-term sustainability.40 Moreover,
Given such constraints on governments, it is possible that government’s with larger
economies would not only have greater resources at its disposal but also might make lawmakers
more amenable to deploying such resources as they would not perceive such a deployment as
detrimental to financial stability. Using a nation’s gross domestic product could be a useful
all-encompassing proxy for measuring a country’s economic health and capacity.
Political Polarization
Political polarization can also have profound consequences in the legislative process,
leading to obstructionism and gridlock. Epstein and Graham (2007) find that political
polarization not only increases congressional gridlock but can affect the independence of the
judiciary and areas of foreign policy as well.41 Mann and Ornstein (2012) show how increased
political extremism utilizes institutional tactics like the filibuster to cause more gridlock.42
Clearly, there is ample evidence to suggest that increased political polarization leads to
legislative inefficiency, setting the stage for a more active central bank.
These observations suggest that greater political polarization would increase the
likelihood of legislatures passing new pieces of legislation; consequently, this would suggest a
42 Ornstein, Norman and Thomas E. Mann. It’s Even Worse Than It Looks. Basic Books, 1 May
2012.
41 Epstein, Diana and John D. Graham. “Polarized Politics and Policy Consequences.” Rand Corporation, 2007.
40 Haksar et al. “Economic Preparedness: The Need for Fiscal Space.” International Monetary Fund Blog, 2018.
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legislature will have difficulty responding to a crisis and might take longer to respond in
comparison to a legislature that exhibits less political polarization.
The Blame Game and the Deflection of Responsibility
In The Myth of Independence: How Congress Governs the Federal Reserve, Sarah Binder
and Mark Spindel track the evolution of the Federal Reserve, its evolving powers, and its
relationship with Congress. Binder and Spindel argue that, contrary to the widely accepted
concept, the Federal Reserve is not independent.43
Since elected officials have an interest in providing short-term economic stimulus, which
can have fatal long term consequences such as inflation, central banks have been constructed to
be insulated from political interference; as a result, monetary decisions are kept away from
politicians interested in promoting themselves, especially right before an election.44 However, in
the case of the United States, “Congress periodically demands greater accountability.”45
As a result, while the Federal Reserve is able to operate on its own, it is constantly
engaged in a “blame game” with Congress, where Congress gives the Federal Reserve more
power, which allows it “to routinely blame the Fed for its policy failures.”46 As a result, “in the
current, polarized era in which politicians routinely stalemate over more aggressive fiscal
stimulus, the burden of generating economic growth in the wake of the crisis and recession rests
even more firmly on the Fed’s shoulders.”47
There is a cycle of Congress revisiting the Federal Reserve’s powers, giving it more
power, and then relying on it in times of gridlock. This suggests the dynamic makes it easier for
Congress to deflect responsibility, especially in times of polarization.
These findings suggest that any variable which would contribute to legislative gridlock,
such as political polarization, might cause the central bank to act swiftly when responding to an





43 Binder, Sarah and Mark Spindel. The Myth of Independence: How Congress Governs the Federal Reserve.”
Princeton University Press, 5 September 2017.
Sharma 17
the legislature to divert attention away from itself to the central bank, softening any negative
electoral ramifications once members of it publicly excoriate the central bank.
Defining a Crisis
In the context of political narratives or the chronicling of presidential administrations, the
term “crisis” is used for numerous contexts. Moreover, the naming of crises like “The Great
Financial Crisis of 2008” or “The European Debt Crisis” does not convey what precipitated the
crisis, when exactly the crisis started, how long the crisis lasted, and how exactly it was resolved;
sometimes, such events cover multiple crises. Consequently, defining what a crisis constitutes is
a difficult task. To resolve this issue, this paper utilizes the definitions and parameters set by
Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial
Folly. Reinhart and Rogoff categorize different financial crises by the nature of each crisis (i.e.
an inflation crisis versus a banking crisis) and provide quantitative methods to measure them.
According to Reinhart and Rogoff’s classifications, there are seven types of crises:
inflation crises, currency crashes, currency debasements, the bursting of asset price bubbles,
banking crises, external debt crises, and domestic debt crises.48 Of the aforementioned
classifications, inflation crises, currency crashes, currency debasements, and the bursting of asset
price bubbles can be defined by quantitative thresholds while banking crises, external debt crises,
and internal debt crises can be defined by events.49 This paper’s analysis will focus specifically
on event-defined crises as this paper is concerned with if and how quickly institutions react when
a crisis occurs; by using the event-defined metric, the paper can clearly utilize dates of when the
crisis started and then see on what dates did the legislature or central bank respond (if at all).
Moreover, this paper will expand the definition of an event-defined crisis; instead of focusing
solely on large bank closures with government interventions, it will also include the addition of
crises that did or would have had economic impacts such as the COVID-19 Pandemic or the
World Trade Center Attacks on September 11, 2001, which also involved Congress and the
Federal Reserve.
49 Ibid.
48 Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton
University Press, 1 September 2009.
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The following section details the threshold criteria set by Reinhart and Rogoff. Inflation
crises are noted by an annual inflation rate of 20 percent or higher; there is also a more extreme
threshold in which inflation exceeds 40 percent.50 Next, currency crashes are marked by an
annual depreciation of the currency against the United States dollar of 15 percent or more.51
There are two types of events that denote banking crises; first, in the case of a systemic crisis,
there will be bank runs that “lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one
or more financial institutions.”52 Second, in the case of a milder, financial distress, “if there are
no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important
financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes
for other financial institutions.”53 External debt crises are defined as “the failure of a government
to meet a principal or interest payment on the due date (or within the specified grace period).
These episodes include instances in which rescheduled debt is ultimately extinguished in terms
less favorable than the original obligation.”54 The event threshold for domestic debt crises is
similar to the external ones but additionally involves “the freezing of bank deposits, and forcible
conversions of such deposits from dollars to local currency.”55
These definitions, criteria, and threshold illuminate what this paper means when referring
to a “crisis.” The data of this paper will closely follow these criteria and, as previously
mentioned, will use a similar framework to include other types of crisis that closely follow the
same guidelines. With these guidelines, this paper can properly define what a crisis is and when
exactly it started; this will help inform if and how quickly legislatures and central banks
responded to the crisis with greater precision.
1.5: This Paper’s Contribution
This paper aims to further clarify the concept of central bank independence, especially in
the context of crisis management. Central banks, though playing a “blame game” with their








given to them. While this may be true, in terms of exercising power, it is possible that the central
bank assesses the capacity of the legislature to react appropriately during a crisis. If the central
bank deems the legislature is not, it might have to step in to compensate for the lack of policy
response; such a relationship would suggest that the central bank, independent in exercising its
power, is beholden to the legislature after all, albeit in a different way. After all, if members of
the legislature knows the central bank will step into manage the crisis, then they may feel more
comfortable not compromising for their own benefit; by not acting, the legislature would then, in
effect, compel the central bank to act.
This paper will try to uncover this potential relationship by connecting the
aforementioned subjects in the literature review with an objective of developing a cohesive
model on how legislative bodies and central banks act in response to crises. By quantitatively
examining these relationships, this paper will explain whether or not there is any evidence to
support the notion that the presence of legislative gridlock causes the central bank to act with
greater urgency.
1.6: Hypotheses
Given the theoretical work, this paper poses several questions to see what factors affect
the dynamics between central banks and legislative bodies; it will examine the effects of these
factors on  five dependent variables: 1) does the central bank act? 2) does the government act? 3)
time passed between the crisis start date and central bank action 4) time passed between the crisis
start date and government action and 5) time passed between central bank and government.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that if there is greater legislative gridlock during a
crisis, the central bank will not only act to address it but act quicker. This hypothesis will be
tested by looking at the effect independent variables, most of which are considered to increase or
decrease legislative gridlock, have on the actions of legislatures and central banks. For example,
more veto points in a system, as George Tsebelis argues, contributes to greater legislative
inefficiencies. With more veto players, multiple policy preferences, ideologies, and electoral
needs must be juggled and consolidated into a cohesive compromise; this can be very difficult,
denying a consensus and prolonging the negotiations process. With an inefficient legislative
body, one that takes longer to enact policy changes, a crisis can become deadly. If the hypothesis
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holds true, then such a development would cause the central bank to take actions to address the
crisis.
In a similar manner, Increased political polarization can result in contradictory policy
positions or governance philosophies held by the existing parties in the political system. It may
be advantageous for certain political actors or political parties to obstruct any potential
legislation or promote inaction; for example, members from an opposition party might find it in
their own best interests to obstruct legislation during an election year. Such an action may make
voters feel as though the incumbents in power are not suited to decisively lead the country
through the crisis. With such politics being played, central banks might have to act with greater
force and speed to stymie a crisis from worsening.
In essence, this paper expects that the presence or greater amount of any variable that is
considered to increase legislative gridlock would also be associated with a greater likelihood of
the central bank acting and a lower likelihood of the legislature acting in response to a crisis.
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Chapter Two: Quantitative Analysis
“I assure this committee that, if I am confirmed, I will be strictly independent of all political
influences … essential to that institutions’ ability to function effectively and achieve its mandated
objectives”
- Federal Reserve Chair, Ben Bernanke
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Chapter Two: Data and Analysis
This chapter aims to determine a quantitative understanding of the discrepancies between
monetary and legislative actions. First, to perform this analysis, the independent and dependent
variables in question must be clearly and narrowly defined. Next, the chapter will look at the
possible correlations between the variables. Once the aforementioned steps are performed, this
section of the paper will examine a multivariate regression to ascertain any significant results.
Finally, the section will conclude with an analysis of the regression’s findings.
As previously mentioned, this paper will look at the responses of developed countries to
crises starting from the 1970s. While examining the policy responses of a broader range of
countries (i.e. emerging markets) might yield additional insights, these countries do not often
have the same resources and fiscal space that the highly developed ones do; consequently,
limiting this paper to developed nations will assist in standardizing underlying conditions in the
analysis.
2.1: Measurement of the Dependent Variables
Since the primary objective of this paper is to understand the delay in action between
central banks and legislative bodies, defining what metric will be used to describe that delay is
crucial. Before that, however, it would be beneficial to see whether or not either of these
institutions acted at all; such an analysis can inform what factors cause these institutions to act in
the first place.
On first glance, it might seem acceptable to simply measure the dependent variable as a
binary one: either the central bank acted first or it did not. However, this measure will most
likely not yield any meaningful insight; the autonomy of central banks allow them to act as
quickly as they would like to whereas legislative bodies go through a much more rigorous
deliberative process. A second measure to consider is the number of days passed between the
actions of the central bank and the legislative body. More days passed between the actions of the
two institutions might be indicative of the underlying impacts of political polarization. However,
even this measure might not fully capture the dynamics between the two institutions. For
example, a central bank might be cooperating with the legislature due to public signalling or
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discussions and act relatively soon to one another. This does not capture how far away from the
start of the crisis did both of these institutions act, which would obscure the efficiency of the
legislative body.
To account for these deficiencies, three main dates will be recorded: the start date of the
crisis, the date on which the central bank first took action in response, and the date on which the
legislature took action in response. From these dates, the days between the start date of the crisis
and central bank action, days between the start of date of the crisis and legislative action, and
days between the actions of the central bank and legislative body. These three dependent
variables broadly capture the dynamics this paper aims to examine.
“Did The Government Act?”
Before understanding the time delay of government action, understanding what factors
might cause a government to act at all is important. To accomplish this, this paper will utilize a
binary dependent variable that measures whether or not the government acted in the crisis (0 -
the government did not act, 1 - the government did act). This variable is coded as “LegAct.”
“Did The Central Bank Act?”
Understanding what factors might cause the central bank to act all is important as well.
To understand this, this paper will utilize a binary dependent variable that measures whether or
not the central bank acted in the crisis (0 - the central bank did not act, 1 - the central bank did
act). This variable is coded as “CBAct.”
“Days Between Crisis Start and Government Action”
This variable measures the amount of days between the start of the crisis and when the
government passes legislation to address it. In this paper, this variable is continuous with the
least amount of days being recorded as 0 and it is coded as “LegDiff.”
“Days Between Crisis Start and Central Bank Action”
This variable measures the amount of days between the start of the crisis and when the
central bank acts to address it. In this paper, this variable is continuous with the least amount of
days being recorded as 0 and it is coded as “CBDiff.”
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“Days Between Central Bank and Government Actions”
This variable measures the amount of days between when the central bank takes action
and the government takes action. In this paper, this variable is continuous with the least amount
of days being recorded as 0 and it is coded as “CBDiff.”
2.2: Measurement of the Independent Variables
“Type of System”
When evaluating the overall effectiveness and efficiency of a legislative body, the type of
system in which that body is organized can play an important role. A considerable amount of
research and evidence points to parliamentary systems being more efficient than presidential
ones. Due to this dynamic, it could be expected that legislatures in parliamentary systems act
relatively quicker than their presidential counterparts when a crisis unfolds. If this is the case, the
days elapsed between the crisis start date and legislative action would be less in parliamentary
systems. This variable is coded as “system” and is sourced from the World Bank’s Database of
Political Institutions; in the original dataset, “system” can have three outcomes (0 - direct
presidential. 1 - strong president elected by assembly, 2 - parliamentary) but all of the countries
relevant to this analysis fall under direct presidential or parliamentary. As a result, “system” will
be treated as a binary variable.
“Plurality”
This variable identifies whether or not a country’s system utilizes plurality voting for its
elections. A plurality voting system is an electoral system where the voter gets to vote for only
one candidate and the candidate who receives more votes than any other candidate is the winner
regardless of whether or not that person received the majority of the vote. Plurality systems are
considered to possibly result in fewer parties, unequal representation, and possibly more political
polarization; a plurality based system might result in more gridlock, causing the central bank to
take faster action as the legislative body lags behind. This variable is coded as “pluralty” and is
taken from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions.
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“Proportional Representation”
This variable identifies whether not a country’s political system has a proportional
representation system. In a proportional representation system, all votes are represented
proportionally in the political body; a certain percentage of votes for a certain political party will
result in that political party receiving that percentage of seats. Proportional representation
systems are considered to lead to less polarization and promote political stability as more
viewpoints are presented in the legislative body. This variable is coded as “pr” and is sourced
from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions.
“Majority”
Not only does having a majority greatly affect a political party or coalition’s prospects of
passing legislation but also the amount by which that entity has a majority greatly matters as
well. The Democratic Party of the United States is often referred to as a “big tent party” because
it encompasses several different factions across different lines; these factions extend to having a
more conservative wing and a more liberal wing as well.56 If the Democratic Party holds a
majority in the senate by 2 seats but both of those senators are more conservative, then the party
might not be able to get larger pieces of legislation passed that are more liberal. Having a larger
majority might allow for the faster passing of legislation. This variable is coded as “maj” and is
obtained from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions.
“Ideology”
A government’s ideology has profound effects on the decisions it makes. In this context,
“the government is understood as the chief executive along with the cabinet, ministries, and top
civil servants.”57 A government with a conservative ideology may believe in the power of
monetary policy and be less quick to act with its own tools, whereas a more liberal government
might be inclined to jump into action with fiscal stimulus or regulatory measures. Understanding
how the ideology of the government (governmental leadership) affects the dynamics this paper is
57 V-Dem Dataset v11.1, V-Dem Institute, 2021
56 Tarlov, Jessica. “The Democratic Party platform represents our big tent.” The Hill, 20 August 2020.
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concerned with can help predict the actions of future governments in times of crisis. This
variable is coded as “v2exl_legitideol” and is sourced from the V-Dem database version 11
provided by the V-Dem Institute, which is housed at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
Specifically, this variable measures the ideology of the government, with larger values
representing more socialistic governments.
“Veto Players”
Another structural variable that affects the efficiency of a legislative body is the
number of veto players (or veto points) in the system. Veto players are those actors who have the
power to overturn or refuse a political action being taken.58 For example, the president of the
United States would be considered a veto player because he or she can veto a law passed by the
United States congress. Due to the power veto players carry, it is commonly understood that the
more veto players a system has the slower the legislative process can become.59 A system with a
greater number of veto players may put more responsibility on its central bank for crisis
responses. The variable is coded as “checks” and has been obtained from the World Bank’s
Database of Political Institutions.
“Political Polarization”
The political polarization of a legislative body has profound effects on its ability to pass
legislation in an efficient manner. Greater polarization within the legislative body would most
likely result in the passage of any legislation to be greatly reduced as multiple political actors
could not come to an agreement. Consequently, greater political polarization would increase the
sluggishness of the legislative body and might require the central bank to act more swiftly in
times of crisis. The variable is coded as “MARPORPOL” and is derived from the The Manifesto
Project, which provides analysis on the policy positions of political parties of many countries
from different time periods. This variable is derived using the following formula from Taylor and
Herman (1971):
59 Ibid.
58 Tsebelis, George. “Decision Making in Political Systems, 1995.
Sharma 27








where V is defined as Variance, n is the total number of seats in the legislative body, N is the
total number of political parties, f1, f2, … fN, are the number of seats held by the N parties, x1, x2,
… xN, are their respective ideological positions on the “left-right” scale, and is the weighted𝑥
mean ideological position.60 The values for polarization were produced using this formula,
substituting in the “RILE” (right-left) scores for political parties found in the Manifesto Project’s
data sets as well as the values for seats per political party and total number of parties.61
“Societal Polarization”
The polarization of society can also have a profound effect on the legislature’s actions as
well, contributing to gridlock and inaction as representatives try to appease their polarized voting
bases. This variable is coded as “Vdempol” and is derived from surveys that track societal
polarization. It is sourced from the V-Dem database version 11 provided by the V-Dem Institute,
which is housed at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
“Real Gross Domestic Product”
Although the countries of observations in this paper’s analyses revolve around countries
with highly developed economies and high standards of living, the following analyses will
attempt to control for any advantages having a larger economy might confer to a country during
a crisis. Moreover, having a larger economy might cause lawmakers to be more amenable to the
deployment of large resources to address a crisis. To understand this possible influence, a
variable will be included that measures historical gross domestic products. The variable is coded
as “realGDP” and is sourced from the World Bank.
61 Manifesto Project Database, 2021
60 Taylor, Michael, and V. M. Herman. “Party Systems and Government Stability.” The American Political Science
Review, vol. 65, no. 1, 1971, pp. 28–37.
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2.3: Inclusion of Interaction Variables
Since political polarization might be affected by institutional factors, this paper will
utilize interaction terms to properly account for this possibility.62 Moreover, political
polarization, as this paper seeks to ascertain, might also affect how the central bank acts in
relation to the governmental body in charge of fiscal policy; this possibility will also be
accounted for in an interaction term. The following are interaction terms that will be included in
this paper’s regression analyses:
“Polarization x System”
This will be the interaction between the continuous variable that measures political
polarization, “MARPORPOL”, and the binary variable that measures whether or not the
country’s legislative system is a parliamentary or presidential one, “system.”  Since the literature
on the matter points to parliamentary systems (which take the value of 0) being less polarized,
the presence of a presidential one (which takes the value 1) would increase political polarization.
“Polarization x Veto Points”
This will be the interaction between the continuous variable that measures political polarization,
“MARPORPOL”, and the continuous variable that measures the amount of veto points in a
governmental system. With more veto points, there are more points for certain political actor(s)
to derail the legislative process for his or her own agenda; with varied agendas across different
veto points, political polarization could increase.
“Polarization x Did Central Bank Act?”
This will be the interaction between the continuous variable that measures political polarization,
“MARPORPOL”, and the binary variable that measures whether or not the country’s central
bank acted to address the crisis, “CBAct.” This interaction can help illustrate the potential
relationship between political polarization and central bank action. If the government is
extremely polarized, the central bank might act quicker; as a result, the central bank acting might
be a sign of higher political polarization.
62 Ornstein, Norman and Thomas E. Mann, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, 2012
Sharma 29
2.4: Correlations
Figure 2: Correlation between Binary Dependent and Independent Variables
This correlation table looks at both of the binary dependent variables: does the
government act and does the central bank act. Out of all the independent variables, the real GDP
has the highest correlation with both dependent binary variables (0.1490 for “LegAct” and
0.1454 for “CBAct”). Although not notably high, these correlations make sense as countries with
higher gross domestic products would have greater fiscal space and developed monetary
institutions.63
Moreover, there is a negative correlation between how socialistic a government’s
ideology is and whether or not the government acts. Although it is a small correlation, -0.1520, it
is still surprising. A more socialistic government would typically be associated with government
action not inaction.
Another interesting correlation to note is that between the two dependent binary
variables;  there is a 0.5098 correlation between the government acting and the central bank
acting. This would make sense as crises require both fiscal and monetary policy to adequately
address them.
63 Haksar et al. “Economic Preparedness: The Need for Fiscal Space.” International Monetary Fund Blog, 2018.
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Figure 3: Correlation between Government Action and Independent Variables
The independent variable with the highest correlation to the days passed between the start
of the crisis and when the government takes action is the measure of the government’s ideology,
“v2exl_legitideol”, with a value of 0.3723. This is somewhat unexpected. Higher values on this
independent variable representative of more socialistic oriented ideology whereas lower values
are representative of more conservative leaning governments. A more socialist-leaning
government would more likely be in favor of using fiscal policy and using government action,
which could be associated with faster action. Here, however, the correlation suggests the
opposite.
The next highest correlation between the days passed between the start of the crisis and
government action is the political polarization. Although the correlation is smaller, at 0.1416, it
supports the notion that polarization increases legislative inaction. Moreover, “Vdempol” has a
correlation of 0.1401, which further suggests that societal polarization would lead to more
legislative gridlock.
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Figure 4: Correlation between Central Bank Action and Independent Variables
In this correlation, the negative correlation of the majority percentage to the days passed
between central bank action and the start of the crisis stands out. Even though the correlation is
small, at -0.0904, it suggests that the central bank might act faster if the majority party has a
larger share of the seats in the government. This would confirm an assertion in Binder and
Spindel (2011) that the central bank does take signals from the government at the time of action
and is beholden to the legislative body.64 With a more solidified majority in the legislative body,
the central bank actors might feel more comfortable taking quicker action.
Another negative correlation, the one between the binary independent variable that
measures whether a country’s governmental system is parliamentary or presidential, “system”,
and days passed between central bank action and the start of the crisis, is interesting as well.
Once again, the correlation is relatively low in absolute terms, -0.1788, but it shows that a
presidential system would more likely be associated with a lower amount of days passed with the
crisis start date and central bank action; a presidential system is considered to be less efficient
than a parliamentary one and might require the central bank to act more swiftly to compensate
for the inefficiency.65
Finally, “Vdempol” has a correlation of -0.1528, which suggests that as societal
polarization increases, the central bank will act faster to resolve a crisis.
65 Gerring et al. “Are Parliamentary Systems Better?”, 2011.
64 Binder and Spindel, The Myth of Independence, 2017.
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Figure 5: Correlation between Difference between Both Actions and Independent Variables
There are a few interesting correlations in this instance. First, the correlation between the
type of governmental system and difference in time between both actions once again supports the
idea that a presidential system would reduce the difference, as the central bank would move to
compensate for an inefficient government.
Next, the negative correlation between the amount of veto points in a system and the
difference between both actions supports the idea that more institutional friction, which could
also contribute to more political polarization, might lead the central bank to act swiftly to
compensate for inefficiency
The correlation between the gross domestic product and the days passed between both
actions could suggest that as a country’s GDP increases, its institutions can better coordinate
policy responses to crises, thus reducing the days passed between the actions of the central bank
and legislative body.
There is a positive correlation of 0.1795 between the days passed between both actions
and how more socialistic a government’s ideology gets. Similar to previous correlations, this
result is surprising. A more socialistic government is associated with more governmental action,
which would reduce the time delay between central bank and governmental action, not increase
it.
Finally, the two polarization measures give encouraging results. First, there is a
correlation of 0.1199 between political polarization, “MARPORPOL” and the days passed. This
suggests that, although it is a small effect, political polarization increases the delay between the
institutions acting. The largest correlation, however, is between societal polarization and the
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difference between the two institutions acting at 0.4545. This suggests that societal polarization
has a huge effect on the delay between the central bank acting and the legislative body acting.
2.5: Multivariate Regression Analyses
To investigate the potential relationships between the aforementioned dependent and
independent variables, five analyses will be performed using multivariate regressions. The two
main dependent variables of interest are “Did The Central Bank Act?” and “Did The Legislature
Act?” First, two logistic regressions will be used to examine the two main dependent variables of
interest. Second, three linear multivariate regression analyses will be performed to establish
potential causal relationships between the independent variables and the amount of days passed
between the start of a crisis and respective institutional actions, which will be used to further
confirm or reject the relationships found in the first two.
The results of each of these regressions will be compared against the literature and will
be used to confirm or deny the hypotheses laid out earlier in the paper. .
Sharma 34
Regression #1: Does The Central Bank Act?
Figure 6: Coefficients and Standard Errors for “Does the Central Bank Act?”
In this logistic regression, four variables were statistically significant: “checks,”
“MARPORPOL,” “polarxchecks,” and “polarxsystem.” “Checks” is statistically significant with
90% confidence, showing that an increase of unit in the amount of veto points is suggestive of a
decrease in the odds of the central bank acting by a factor of 0.4384631. Furthermore,
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“MARPORPOL” is statistically significant at 90%, meaning that an increase of one unit of
political polarization is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of the central bank acting by
a factor of 0.9740691. The interaction variables “polarxsystem” and “polarxchecks” are also
significant; this means that having different systems and different amount of veto points
influences the value of political polarization. While the significance of these interaction variables
support the idea that political polarization is affected by the structural engineering of the
legislature, political polarization ultimately does not affect the likelihood of the central bank
acting.
The independent variables that were not statistically significant are also worth looking at.
While “system”  was close to being statistically significant with 90% confidence, it ultimately
was not. This might mean that, barring some glaring cases, the central bank is not concerned
with how efficient the legislature is when responding to a crisis, giving credence to its own
autonomy. “Pluralty” and “pr” are also not significant; this means the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected, suggesting the type of representational system has no bearing on whether the central
bank will act or not during a crisis. “Vdempol” is also not statistically significant, suggesting that
broader societal polarization will not have an effect on the central bank’s actions in a crisis.
Finally, “v2exl_legitideol is not statistically significant; this result is surprising as it would be
expected that the presence of a more socialistic government would decrease the likelihood of the
central bank acting as the government would be more active by itself.
` The statistical significance of the number of veto points is not consistent with the
hypothesis that more veto points leads to legislative inefficiency, causing the central bank to act
in order to compensate for inaction. So, according to the literature, whereas the chances of policy
making decreases with an increase in the number of veto points, the central bank act is more
likely to make a decision. The main hypothesis of this paper is also rejected; increased political
polarization, as the results of the regression convey, does not put more of the burden of resolving
crises on the central bank. Before definitively rejecting the effect of the number of veto points
and political polarization on the dynamic between central banks and legislative bodies, however,
the variable’s relationship with government action must be examined as well.
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Regression #2: Does The Government Act?
Figure 7: Coefficients and Standard Errors  for “Does the Legislature Act?”
This logistic regression maintains all the independent variables from the previous one but
adds two more: “CBAct” and the interaction term “polarxcbact.” This is done to test the notion
of whether or not the central bank provides cover for crisis responses. Furthermore, it assists in
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testing the question whether or not central banks are more likely to act in more politically
polarized environments. There are two statistically significant variables: “v2exl_legitideol”,
“polarxsystem.” “v2exl_legitideol” is statistically significant with 95% confidence, meaning the
presence of a more socialistic government is associated with a decrease in the odds ratio of the
government acting by a factor of 0.2556274. “Polarxsystem” is statistically significant with 95%
confidence, meaning that the presence of a presidential governmental system does affect
polarization; specifically, in this analysis, the presence of a presidential governmental system
will increase the slope of political polarization.
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Regression #3: Days Between Crisis Start Date and Central Bank Action
Figure 8: Coefficients and Standard Errors  for “Days Between Crisis Start Date and Central
Bank Action”
Sharma 39
In this multivariate regression, no independent variable is statistically significant. It is
interesting to see that the number of veto points, “checks”, is not statistically significant since
“checks” was found to decrease the likelihood that the central bank acts in the first place. This
might indicate that the number of veto points, and thereby legislative inefficiency, does not affect
how quickly a central bank acts but just influences whether it acts or not in either direction.
Similarly, the null hypothesis that political polarization does not affect the days between the
crisis start date and central bank action cannot be rejected.
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Regression #4: Days Between Crisis Start Date and Government Action
Figure 9: Coefficients and Standard Errors  for “Days Between Crisis Start Date and
Government Action”
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In this multivariate regression, two independent variables are statistically significant:
“v2exl_legitideol” and “system.”  “System” is statistically significant with 95% confidence,
meaning that an increase of one unit is associated with a decrease of -771.5611 units of the days
passed. This result is surprising because it suggests that a presidential system is likely to decrease
the days passed. The literature suggests that presidential systems are less able to adapt to
situations and are inefficient at passing legislation. “v2exl_legitideol” is statistically significant
with 90% confidence, meaning that an increase of one unit in socialistic ideology increases the
days passed between the crisis start date and government action by 223.1531 units. This is also
surprising because a socialistic government is associated with more fiscal spending and swifter
government responses.
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Regression #5: Days Between Central Bank Action and Government Action
Figure 10: Coefficients and Standard Errors  for “Days Between Central Bank and
Government Action”
In this multivariate regression, two independent variables are statistically significant:
“system” and “Vdempol.” “System” is statistically significant with 90% confidence and
“Vdempol” is statistically significant with 90% confidence. The result for “system” is surprising
because it suggests that the presence of a presidential system is associated with a decrease in the
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days passed by -492.4758 units. The literature suggests that presidential systems are less able to
adapt to situations and are inefficient at passing legislation, the opposite of what the regression’s
results convey. “Vdempol” also suggests that an increase in a unit of societal polarization is
associated with an increase in the amount of days passed by 202.3841 units; this supports the
hypothesis that increased polarization increases the action-delay between central banks and
legislative bodies. However, this is the only ti
One interaction term, “polarxsystem,” is statistically significant with 90%
confidence, meaning that, as previous regressions have shown, the type of system has an effect
on the amount of political polarization in the political system, meaning the slope of political
polarization will be greater in a presidential system.
2.6: Discussion and Limitations
The results of the regression analyses were surprising and unexpected. In many
instances, the regression s conveyed results opposite to what the paper expected; in others, the
null hypothesis for independent variables simply could not be rejected.
For the first question, “does the central bank act?”, the results do not support the
hypothesis that the amount of veto points and political polarization have an influence on whether
or not the central bank acts. In fact, the results suggest the opposite of what was expected. While
this paper expected to find that greater political polarization and more veto points would be
associated with an increase in the likelihood that the central bank acts, the results of the logistic
regression suggest they actually decrease that likelihood. The literature on veto points and the
successful passage of legislation suggests that more veto points would increase gridlock as there
are more actors involved with the ability to veto the policy proposal or decision in question. This
paper hypothesized, as a result, the central bank might act swiftly to stabilize any deleterious
effects; this was not proven.
In a similar manner, this paper considered the notion that political polarization can render
a legislative body useless by promoting gridlock. More political polarization suggests the
presence of contradicting governance philosophies or policy positions held by existing members
and political parties in the legislature; this would likely result in clashes on large topics of debate
such as how to solve a crisis, causing friction and gridlock. Consequently, this legislative friction
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would implore the central bank to act in order to stabilize the crisis, taking actions that could
substitute for fiscal stimulus in the short-run; this was not supported by the quantitative analysis.
Political polarization is also affected by other systemic independent variables. The
regression of the first question suggests that the value of political polarization, the one
specifically in legislative bodies, changes as the type of legislative system changes and the
amount of veto points increases.
While these results help shed light on one of the main questions of inquiry - that greater
gridlock-inducing characteristics cause the central bank to act - it leaves much to be desired in
other areas. First, the Pseudo R-squared value of this regression is only 0.2074; this means that
the independent variables are not completely explaining the variations in the dependent variable.
There might be other variables that have not been considered, which could improve this value.
Models with more or different variables that test the same dependent variable might provide a
better fit. Another issue is that while political polarization was statistically significant, societal
polarization was not. These two are considered to be related, with one relating to the polarization
of the political body while the other tracks polarization across societally more broadly.
The second question, “does the legislature act?” had some mixed results as well. First,
this analysis rejects the hypothesis that governments with more socialistic ideologies are
associated with the government acting during a crisis; these types of governments should favor
fiscal stimulus packages and government intervention, whereas more conservative governments
would shy away from such intervention. Evidence to support this idea was not found. This
regression’s results, again, is consistent with the interaction between the political polarization
and the type of system the legislature has.
This analysis did not confirm the hypothesis that more political polarization would lead
to a decrease in the likelihood of the government acting nor does it confirm the hypothesis that
the larger a majority is, the more likely the government is to act and get legislation passed. It is
possible that while these variables do have an affect on the functioning of a legislature, they
simply are overcome during a crisis when the government must quickly decide to act or not.
The third dependent variable of inquiry, the amount of days passed between the crisis
start date and central bank action, had the lowest R-squared value of the remaining three
performed analyses with a value of 0.1086. Moreover, no independent variables or interaction
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terms were statistically significant. This could suggest that none of these variables have any
bearing on how quickly the central bank acts.
The regression for the fourth dependent variable, days between crisis start date and
government action, yielded the second highest R-squared value of 0.4622. However, the results
were surprising. First, while “v2exl_legitideol,” which measures how socialistic a government is,
was statistically significant, it has the opposite effect on the time passed than expected. The
original hypothesis for this relationship was that the more socialistic a government is, the quicker
it will move to take action. The result, however, suggests that a more socialistic government will
lead to an increase in the time passed between the crisis start date and government action. This
might suggest that a government that is willing to take action in the first place might lead to more
time being passed; constructing legislation and navigating multiple elected officials simply might
take longer. Second, “system” is statistically significant as well but with the opposite effect than
what was expected. The literature suggests that a presidential system is less efficient, possibly
meaning that they will take longer in passing legislation; the result suggests that the presence of
presidential systems decreases the amount of days passed between the crisis start date and
government action. This result is puzzling. One possible explanation that would need further
probing is the importance of the executive in the presidential system. Since the president is voted
in by the broadest cross-section of citizens, he or she might be able to gain broader support and
compel members of the legislature to act swifty. In the United States, the “rally around the flag
effect” and usage of the “bully pulpit” by the president might serve as topics of inquiry to test
this possibility and incorporate it into this piece of work.6667
Finally, the regression for the fifth dependent variable, days between government and
central bank action, yielded the highest R-squared value of 0.4854. Once again, “system”
produced the opposite result of what was expected with presidential systems being associated
with a decrease in the time passed.
This regression results in a statistical significance of societal polarization on the time
passed between both actions. This confirms the idea that polarization increases governmental
inefficiency; however, political polarization, which is meant to be closely related to societal
polarization, was not statistically significant.
67 Mervin, David. “The Bully Pulpit, II.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1, 1995.
66 Mueller, John. "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson". American Political Science Review, 1970.
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Since the results of the analyses were mixed, it is worthwhile exploring some of the
limitations in the design and methodology. First, there may be some omitted variable bias present
in the regressions, presenting a threat to internal validity. There are many factors that contribute
to the functioning of legislative bodies and central banks but not all of them could be measured
and included. Two of these potential variables, whose values are difficult to measure or gather,
are not included in the set of variables examined which could be correlated with the dependent
variable: the ideology of the central bank leader and staff and the effect of past crises on the
current one. For the prior, there is no database on the historical ideologies of central bankers
across the world. This presents a problem as it is possible that just as the ideology of a
government would have an effect on the actions it takes, the economic and political philosophies
of central bankers would have an effect on theirs. For example, Paul Volcker famously refused to
lower interest rates despite the urging of President Ronald Reagan because he was concerned
with lowering inflation.68 However, this may not always be the case, which is related to the
second potential omitted variable of concern: the effect of past crises on current ones. Jerome
Powell, for instance, has a conservative background but has consistently supported fiscal
stimulus for the COVID-19 induced recession and has rigorously used the powers of the Federal
Reserve. It is possible that the lessons learned by the central bank from the 2008 financial crisis
have greatly shifted viewpoints on monetary and fiscal policy. Regardless of the effects of these
variables, researchers might find it useful to derive a method to measure them; including such
data in future analyses will most likely strengthen any regression and yield important insights.
Another potential limitation of the analysis lies within the measurement of the
independent variables. Some errors in the consistent measuring of  independent variables might
exist as they rely heavily on subjective categorizing; for example, societal polarization relies on
surveys of people who may have very different perceptions on how the values for polarization
correspond with how polarized society specifically is. Similarly, the RILE index that the
MARPOR data relies on may not measure the ideological values of political parties across
countries in a consistent manner. For example, the contemporary Democratic Party in the United
States shares elements of center-right, center-left, and far-left individual political parties found
across Europe.
68 Long, Heather. “Who is Jerome Powell, Trump’s pick for the nation’s most powerful economic position?” The
Washington Post, 2 November 2017.
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A potential threat to external validity may lie within the differences between countries.
While this analysis purposefully chose countries with highly developed economies and high
standards of living, there are still large differences that may not apply to other countries which
might grow into highly developed economics with high living standards. Country-specific
cultural, political, and societal issues might be contributing certain results that were observed; it
is important to note that most nations in the cross-section of data used are western ones.
Non-western democracies that increasingly become more developed may or may not face similar
phenomena as the regressions suggest subject to their distinct internal characteristics.
A possible explanation for the overall results is that while the legislature imbues the
central bank with new powers after a crisis, and certain members of the legislature might hope
that the central bank takes action during gridlock, the central bank ultimately might tread
carefully as it wants to maintain credibility as an institution and not be further regulated by the
legislature.
2.7: Conclusion
The objective of this quantitative analysis was to understand the effects of institutional
and political characteristics of the legislature, mainly political polarization, on how the central
bank acts. To understand this in a more granular lens, the analysis ran five regressions to test the
following dependent variables: 1) does the central bank act? 2) does the government act? 3) time
passed between the crisis start date and central bank action 4) time passed between the crisis start
date and government action and 5) time passed between central bank and government.
In sum, this paper found that, with a few exceptions, the null hypothesis for most
variables (that they have no impact on the dependent variables) could not be rejected. In the few
instances where the null hypothesis could be rejected, the results contradicted what was
originally expected, suggesting that not only does gridlock not cause central banks to act or move
with more speed but also it may cause the central bank to hold back, matching the overall
political attitudes in the legislature.
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Chapter 3: Qualitative Analysis
“In a world of global trade and integrated capital markets, it is natural for economic and
financial shocks and policy actions to be transmitted across borders.”
- Federal Reserve Chair, Jerome Powell
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Chapter 3: COVID-19: A Tale of Two Countries
To further understand the results found in the quantitative analyses, this section will
examine a comparative analysis of two countries’ respective responses to the COVID-19
pandemic. This section will compare the dynamics between legislative bodies and central banks
in the United States, which has been considered to have a poor response time to the crisis, and
the Republic of Korea, which has been praised for its exceptional containment of the pandemic
and its effects. First, the section will provide a timeline of what and when each country did.
Then, the statistically significant factors from the quantitative analysis will be examined in the
context of these two countries to see if they had consistent results with what those analyses
found.
3.1: The United States of America
The United States’ response to the coronavirus pandemic has been widely criticized and
ranked among one of the worst global responses to the coronavirus pandemic.69 Despite its vast
amount of resources, the United States did not continuously pass legislation to address the
ongoing effects of the pandemic as it raged on while other nations did. To understand why this
occurred, this section will examine the timeline of the coronavirus pandemic in the United States,
the responses of different political actors, and the resulting legislation to address the crisis; it will
further examine how polarization affected each step of the way.
The first case of COVID-19 was reported on December 31st, 2019 in Wuhan, China.70
While the problem seemed to be contained within China at the time, COVID-19 soon infected
multiple individuals across the world in less than a month.71 The first case in the United States
was reported on January 21st, 2020. Close to a week later, the World Health Organization had
declared COVID-19 a global health emergency.72 By this time, the politicization of the
coronavirus had already begun with actors from different political parties taking vastly different
stances.73
73 “Republicans, Democrats Move Even Further Apart in Coronavirus Concerns.” Pew Research, 25 June 2020.
72 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
70 “A Timeline of Covid-19 Developments in 2020.” The American Journal of Managed Care, 1 January 2021.
69 Study ranks New Zealand Covid-19 response best, Brazil worst, US in bottom five.” France24, 28 January 2021.
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Ahead of the 2020 presidential election, the United States was facing unprecedented
levels of political polarization that began rising from 2010, with someone even comparing it to
levels not seen since the Civil War.74 Such polarization was seen to manifest itself in
Congressional obstructionism of the previous presidential administration as well as the large
swing in economic and social policy preferences from the last administration to the Trump
administration. Moreover, the policy preferences of both major parties also began moving
towards the extremes of their ideologies, diminishing the voices of those with more centrist
viewpoints.75
After the declarations of public emergencies, the Trump administration moved to restrict
travel to and from China in hopes of preventing further spread of the coronavirus; this decision
immediately came under contention with Democratic elected officials like Speaker of the House
Nancy Pelosi publicly excoriating it.76 From February 20th and onwards, a slew of crises and
large decisions began to unfold. First, the markets experienced a crash like it had not seen since
the Great Recession of 2008 on February 20th. Moreover, the World Health Organization and the
United States declared COVID-19 a pandemic and a national emergency respectively.77 To
restore confidence in the markets, which had crashed once again on March 9th, and address the
economic fallout that millions of Americans would face due to the pandemic, President Trump
called on Congress to pass a stimulus package on March 17th 2020.78
While these crises occurred and President Trump began negotiations with Congress on a
relief bill, the Federal Reserve under the leadership Chairman Jerome Powell quickly responded
by cutting interest rates starting on March 15th, stabilizing financial markets by providing
liquidity, and supporting the flow of credit throughout the economy by utilizing its special
powers under the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility, which allows the Federal
Reserve to help small businesses so they can keep their workers on payroll, and the Main Street
Lending Program, which provides loans to small and mid-sized businesses.79 Together, these
79 “Federal Reserve takes additional actions to provide up to $2.3 trillion in loans to support the economy.” The
Federal Reserve, 9 April 2020.
78 Ibid.
77 “A Timeline of Covid-19 Developments in 2020.” The American Journal of Managed Care, 1 January 2021.
76 Klar, Rebecca,. “Pelosi  says Trump’s China travel ban wasn’t ‘this great moment.’” The Hill, 26 April 2020.
75 “Political Polarization in the American Public.” Pew Research, 12 June 2014.
74 Drtuman, Lee. “American politics has reached peak polarization.” Vox, 24 March 2016.
Sharma 51
efforts helped stabilize the economy in the short run as Congress figured out how to address the
problems facing it.80
Nine days after the President's request to Congress, the Senate passed the CARES act and
the following day President Trump signed it, signing into law “the largest recovery package in
history,” sending direct payments to Americans and expanding unemployment insurance.8182 So
far, the legislature and central bank have worked in tandem to effectively stabilize and address
the economic and health crises stemming from the coronavirus pandemic. However, behind the
scenes, the aforementioned polarizing statements and policy preferences only continued to cause
issues. Whereas multiple Democratic officials stated that the recovery package does not
adequately address the needs of everyday people, the Republican officials blamed good chunks
of it as wasteful spending and the disincentivizing of work.83
Subsequent relief bills were promised by both the Democrats and Republicans but to no
avail. The Republican-controlled Senate introduced a package that would provide another
stimulus check, more funds for small businesses, and liability protections for “companies seeking
to bring employees back to the workplace during the pandemic.”84 This package was introduced
on July 27th, 2020, four months after the original recovery package was signed into law.
However, as “jobless claims [reached] a record high of 1.186 million”, talks for a second
recovery package stalled under the divided government.85 Much of the disagreements were
purely between ideological lines in the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives and the
Republican-controlled Senate. For example, multiple Democratic representatives wanted to
increase the stimulus check amount but wanted to get rid of liability protections for large
corporations seeking to employ workers during the pandemic.86 As a result the Democratic
House of Representatives also introduced rival bills that conformed more to their ideological
wants. There was little to no room for compromise.
86 Horsely, Scott. “Lawmakers Split Over Liability Protections In Pandemic Relief Bill Negotiations.” NPR, 14
December 2020.
85 Ibid.
84 “A Timeline of Covid-19 Developments in 2020.” The American Journal of Managed Care, 1 January 2021.
83 Levine, Marianne and John Bresnahan. “Republican infighting leads to embarrassing setback on aid.” Politico, 23
July 2020.
82 Snell, Kelsey. “What’s Inside the Senate’s $2 Trillion Coronavirus Aid Package.” NPR, 26 March 2020.
81 “A Timeline of Covid-19 Developments in 2020.” The American Journal of Managed Care, 1 January 2021.
80 Irwin, Neil. “How the Fed’s Quick Action May Have Given Congress Cover for Inaction.” The New York Times,
15 September 2020.
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Throughout this period of inaction, the Federal Reserve continued to, with its augmented
powers under the CARES Act, support the economy. These new powers are consistent with what
Binder and Spindel found in their research; Congress gave new powers to the Federal Reserve
right after a crisis. Using these powers, the Federal Reserve kept providing loans to entities that
needed them, injecting more money into the economy. As this happened though, Jerome Powell
repeatedly signalled to Congress that they must utilize fiscal tools as his mandate was being
stretched thin.87
Due to the gridlock, the second recovery package did not get passed until almost a year
later, under a new presidential administration and unified government; it is important to keep in
mind that some provisions in this package were also disagreed upon by members of the same
party at first and no one from the opposition party voted for it.88
3.2: South Korea
The case of South Korea serves as a stark contrast to that of the United States;
interestingly enough, South Korea had its first reported case on the same exact day as the United
States; this fact serves to highlight the differences in response times.
Within 10 days of the first case, the government announced a $17 million epidemic
prevention budget that would be used to stymie the virus’ spread.89 Four days later, the
government further announced it will spend 4.8 billion KRW as an emergency fund.90 On
February 26th, the government once again announced an aid package of 51.3 billion KRW that
will be distributed to 10 cities; this was followed by an announced rent reduction of
approximately 20-35% for small businesses.91 On March 18th, another aid package of 51.9
billion KRW was announced. It is important to note that while having a similar political system
as the United States, South Korea had passed multiple aid packages whereas the United States
still had not passed one.
91 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
89 Cha, Victor and Dana Kim. “A Timeline of South Korea’s response to COVID-19.” Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 27 March 2020.
88 Pramuk, Jacob. “Biden signs $1.9 trillion Covid relief bill, clearing way for stimulus checks, vaccine aid.” CNBC,
11 March 2021.
87 Saphir, Ann and Howard Schneider. “Powell says economy still needs Fed support, pushes back on inflation
worries.” Reuters, 23 February 2021.
Sharma 53
On top of these spontaneous aid increases, the South Korean government launched four,
large stimulus packages with the last one being worth over $6.5 billion.92 Multiple institutions
have pointed to South Korea’s quick and aggressive fiscal response as one of the main reasons
why it is not suffering like so many of its fellow OECD nations.93 At the same time, the Bank of
Korea kept rates low and provided temporary “unlimited” funds to businesses who needed them
in terms of loans.94 Unlike in the American case, the legislature’s roles were front and center as a
part of the crisis response not the monetary institutions.
3.3: Comparison via Quantitative Factors
When turning back to the quantitative section, the paper found that the amount of veto
points and political polarization had an opposite effect of what was expected in respect to the
likelihood the central bank acts; an increase in veto points and political polarization decreases
the likelihood the central bank acts. The United States possesses a greater number of veto points
and greater political polarization than South Korea, yet each country's respective central banks
acted to address the crisis. This suggests that these factors may not have any bearing on the
central bank’s actions. It is quite possible, just as the idea of central bank independence supports,
that the central bank acts when it concludes the crisis at hand requires it, not because of
legislative inefficiency.
Another unexpected result from the quantitative section was that the presence of a more
socialistic-government would decrease the likelihood that the government acts to address it; the
paper expected that the presence of a more socialistic-governemnt would increase such
likelihood. Moreover, the paper expected that a more socialistic-government would be quicker in
responding to a crisis. Once again, the opposite result was found. The comparison of the case
studies, however, confirms this paper’s original expectations. The conservative government of
the Trump administration took longer to act, even in regards to unilateral actions the executive
holds, whereas the center-left government of the Moon Jae-in acted much quicker in South
Korea.
94 “Bank of Korea to extend unlimited repo operations for one month by July.” Reuters, 29 June 2020.
93 Pesek, William. “South Korea Shows OECD How It’s Done in COVID-19 Era.” Forbes, 29 January 2021.
92 “South Korea draws extra $6.6 billion budget to help small businesses, households.” Reuters, 10 September 2020.
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Finally, the quantitative analysis found that greater levels of societal polarization leads to
an increase between the time the legislature acts and the central bank acts. In the case of the
United States, which has higher societal polarization in contrast to South Korea, this is consistent
with the quantitative results.
Considering the comparison of the United States and South Korea is not completely
consistent with the quantitative results, it is possible that there are many other factors that affect
the questions of interest. The cultural, historical, and societal characteristics of both the United
States and South Korea are vastly different, which might affect the variables of interest in
differing ways.
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Chapter 4: Summary and Conclusion
“We’re a democratic society. Shutting down the government should not be on the agenda”
- Federal Reserve Chair, Alan Greenspan
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4.1 Conclusions
While monetary and fiscal tools are delegated to two separate institutions – central banks
and legislatures – only one of them is directly accountable to voters. Despite this fact, central
banks are increasingly being seen as close substitutes for legislative action with some economists
calling for the Federal Reserve to be given more powers such as allowing for direct cash
transfers to Americans, an idea once proposed by Milton Friedman.95 Such a development may
seem efficient, as money could be delivered to those who need it without the tedious logistics of
Congress; however, it would absolve those who are elected from performing their duties.
Increasingly, central banks are playing larger roles in addressing economic crises, seemingly
providing cover for the legislature. Consequently, it is important to understand what underlying
factors contribute to a legislature’s inefficiency and a central bank’s subsequent actions.
The first set of factors that influence the dynamics between central banks and legislatures
can be categorized as institutional: those factors that are engineered into the political system and
not dependent on shifting attitudes of constituents or political actors. Political systems with more
veto points are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of a central bank acting in response to
a crisis. However, the number of veto points is not statistically significant for any other point of
inquiry.  Another surprising result was that a presidential system was statistically significant in
two of the analyses but had an opposite effect to what was affected, which opens the door for
further analysis of the power a president holds in addressing a crisis.
The second set of factors that influence the dynamics between central banks and
legislatures can be categorized as political: those factors that are dependent on shifting attitudes
of political actors and constituents. One of the most important quantitative findings is that
increased political polarization makes it less likely for the central bank to act in response to a
crisis. On the other hand, an increase in societal polarization is associated with an increase in the
delay between central bank and governmental action. These statistically significant results do not
support the hypothesis that, in times of increased political polarization, central banks cover the
legislature's responsibility by responding. Moreover, the presence of a more socialistic
government decreases the likelihood of a government acting in times of crisis; this does not
confirm the assertion that more socialistic governments are more willing to use fiscal stimulus
95 Wolf, Martin. “The case for helicopter money.” The Financial Times, 12 February 2013.
Sharma 57
and government intervention as solutions. The expected effect of a more socialistic government
was contradicted in another regard as well. When examining the effects it has on the time passed
between a government’s action and the start of a crisis, the presence of a more socialistic
government increases the time passed according to the analysis. This might suggest that a
government that is willing to take action at all will need more time to actually get legislation
passed.
The comparison of the United States and the Republic of Korea assisted in supporting
some of this paper’s original expectations or providing evidence against the results from the
quantitative analysis. However, the fact there were not any strong consistent results with the
quantitative analysis means there may be more factors, like cultural, ethnic, historical, and
societal, at play which affects how urgently a legislature responds to crises and how a central
bank reacts in response.
In sum, the main hypothesis, that the presence of factors associated with legislative
gridlock would also be associated with an increase in the likelihood of the central bank acting
and with more speed, was not proven.
4.2 Future Considerations
This paper utilized a cross section of data that attempts to gauge different characteristics
of the legislature; the paper tries to understand the influence this data has on the dynamic
between central banks and legislatures. However, there may be many different internal reasons to
the central bank that causes it to act a certain way. For example, different heads of the central
bank may strongly subscribe to different economic theories and philosophies of government.
Furthermore, their own previous experiences with crises might greatly influence how they view
crises should be dealt with. For example, Paul Volcker was very committed to fighting inflation
with high interest rates and President Reagan and Congress signalling him to stop multiple
times.96
To do a more complete, two sided analysis a data set that surveys these internal
characteristics about central banks should be constructed. It can then be added to the regressions
performed in this paper and might yield differing results. For example, such an analysis may
96 Fuerbringer, Jonathan. “Reagan Criticizes Fed’s Move.” The New York Times, 20 January 1982.
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prove that how a central bank acts really act is not influenced much by the legislature’s
inefficiencies but rather its own internal ideologies and characteristics.
4.3: Final Words
Central banks are not directly responsible to voters; as democracies seemingly become
more inefficient, central banks are caught picking up the slack. As a result, more policy makers
may be willing to give the central bank even more unilateral powers due its inefficiencies. This
reasoning absolves the policy makers that constituents vote in from passing legislation, letting
the central banks provide cover for them and then blaming them when responses aren’t the best.
Consequently, it is important to gauge factors that contribute to this dynamic. Although Congress
may not give the Federal Reserve directly money transfer power any time soon, it is important to
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Figure 15: Full Results for Regression #5
